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SUMMARYEurope specialises more than its main global competitors in indus-
tries with relatively high carbon emissions, such as minerals and chemicals,
rather than in high-tech industries and services .  This would have a real effect
on Europe’s competitiveness in a world regulated by carbon pricing schemes
such as the EU’s Emissions Trading Scheme – even if other blocs apply them
as the EU does. Furthermore, in the absence of fair and undistorting carbon
pricing schemes worldwide, there is a real risk that business will resort to
regulatory arbitrage which will entail a shift in where emissions take place –
but no reduction in global emissions.  In any case, the issue of which econo-
mies are ‘carbon competitive’ will gradually become a much bigger part of the
global trade conversation.
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Europe’s climate change policies should
have as their primary goal the fight against
climate change. But they should also
minimise the economic impact of carbon
pricing schemes and avoid introducing
competitive distortions through sectoral
‘carve-outs’ from common rules and ‘grand-
fathering’ of permits to pollute. Because it
is more vulnerable than other economies to
carbon pricing, as a result of the relatively
high carbon-intensity of its export mix, the
EU must i) ensure that carbon abatement
mechanisms allow emissions to be cut at
the lowest cost; ii) reduce competitive dis-
tortions by pushing for widespread use of
carbon pricing schemes; and iii) avoid
trade-skewing sectoral ‘carve-outs’ from
such schemes at national level.
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Carbon intensity:the EU’s export mix
contains a higher percentage of high
carbon-intensity goods than the export
mixes of China or the United Statesb
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WHY EUROPE IS NOT CARBON COMPETITIVE
1.CLIMATE CHANGE
POLICIES AFFECT
COMPETITIVENESS
CLIMATEchange policies introduce a
new factor into the determination of
global competitiveness. Climate
change policies, in particular carbon
pricing schemes (see Box 1), imply
additional costs for firms. Some
sectors are more affected than
others. Potential competitive
distortions are bound to rank high
on government agendas when
implementing climate changes
policies.
One of the main issues is the asym-
metric application of climate
change policies. Europe has com-
mitted to an ambitious climate
change agenda and
has introduced a com-
prehensive carbon
pricing scheme.
Companies in Japan
are also subject to a
cap-and-trade system
in which they buy and
sell carbon credits. The
United States and China, meanwhile,
do not price carbon. This clearly puts
European products at a competitive
disadvantage.
But this is not the only concern. As
pointed out by the Stern Review
(2006, chapter 11), ‘even where
action is taken on a more uniform
collective basis, con-
cern remains that dif-
ferent countries will be
affected differently’ by
carbon pricing policies
owing to their respec-
tive competitive advan-
tages and product spe-
cialisation. Countries
specialised in services will be less
affected by a carbon price than
countries specialised in the
production of steel and aluminium.
This policy brief
1deals with this sub-
ject: how does a country’s speciali-
sation determine the impact of
carbon pricing on competitiveness?
Countries specialised in carbon
intensive products might be tempt-
ed to exclude some sectors from
carbon pricing schemes (via sec-
toral exemptions or generous grand-
fathering of emission permits) or
not to implement carbon pricing
schemes at all, thus undermining
the objectives of climate change
policies and introducing
competitive distortions.
How this challenge is addressed is
crucial for the effectiveness of cli-
mate change policies. The export
mix represents ‘what a country does
best’ in the world and this is difficult
to change. This policy brief identifies
those countries that are specialised
in carbon intensive products and
are thus more exposed to carbon
pricing policies and proposes what
should be done to reduce exposure
of countries to carbon pricing
policies in the least distorting way. 
The next section of this policy brief
analyses the relative carbon
BOX 1
CARBON PRICING SCHEMES: TAXES AND CAP-AND-TRADE
Policymakers presently have two main options when regulating carbon
dioxide and other emissions: taxes and cap-and-trade.
An example of the former is the United Kingdom’s climate change levy
(CCL), introduced in 2001. This is a tax on gas, liquefied petroleum gas, and
electricity consumed by industrial, commercial and public sector users.
Electricity generated from renewables and some more environmentally-
friendly means of energy consumption are exempt. The scheme also
includes compensating measures, such as social security payment rebates,
to protect the competitiveness of UK firms. The UK government says the CCL
will result in annual carbon reductions of 2.5 million tonnes by 2010. Other
EU countries, including, prominently, Denmark and Sweden, have similar
levies specifically targeting carbon emissions.
Cap-and-trade schemes involve setting a cap on greenhouse gas emissions,
allocating certificates to cover the amount of desired emissions, and requir-
ing the industrial plants to buy additional certificates for excess emissions
or to reduce their emissions. The world’s largest cap-and-trade scheme is
the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), which began trading in January
2005 and covers industrial installations representing around half of the EU’s
annual CO2 output. Similar trading schemes exist in some US states and in
non-EU European countries such as Norway. The Australian government
proposed a scheme in mid-2007 and a bill proposing a cap-and-trade
scheme is currently being discussed by the US Congress.
Tax and cap-and-trade schemes can overlap with companies being effec-
tively double-charged for their emissions. The European Commission opened
state aid investigations against both Denmark and Sweden in late 2006
over plans to exempt companies covered by the EU ETS from national
carbon taxes. As emissions certificates are largely given free to ETS
participants, the Commission argued, companies are not financially
penalised by the ETS unless they exceed their emission caps, whereas tax
reductions could contravene the EU’s Energy Tax Directive.
‘Europe’s economies
are less carbon
competitive than
generally pictured.’
1Acknowledgements: I
am very grateful to
Emanuele Ciriolo for his
excellent research
assistance, to Stephen
Gardner for his com-
ments (and for Box 1)
and to other colleagues
at Bruegel for their
extensive comments
and suggestions.WHY EUROPE IS NOT CARBON COMPETITIVE
b
r
u
e
g
e
l
p
o
l
i
c
y
b
r
i
e
f 03
2Unfortunately
emissions of the
electricity, gas and
water supply sectors
are aggregated in our
data. We use such
emissions as a proxy
for emissions of the
electricity sector.
3The data covers 26
sectors. The granularity
of the data does not
allow us to distinguish
whether the emissions
of any of the 26 sectors
in any two countries
differ because they use
different technologies
or because they pro-
duce different goods
within the same sector.
intensity of Europe’s exports. The
third section compares Europe’s
export mix  with those of its main
rivals and explains why it is impor-
tant. The fourth section examines
the scope of carbon pricing
schemes and why gaps in such
schemes matter, in particular for
Europe. The final section makes
concrete policy suggestions.
2.THE CARBON INTENSITY
OF EUROPE’S EXPORTS
The carbon intensity of exports is
the amount of carbon dioxide emit-
ted per export unit. Calculating it
requires an evaluation not only of
the emissions derived from the
production of the product itself, but
also the carbon dioxide emitted in
the production of the inputs used to
produce it. That is, not only the
direct carbon emissions but also
the indirect emissions.
The total carbon embodied in
exports differs significantly across
countries (see Figure 1). UK,
France, Italy, Austria and Germany
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Source: Bruegel (see Box 2).
BOX 2
DETERMINANTS OF THE CARBON INTENSITY OF EXPORTS
Three main factors determine the total carbon intensity of exports:
1) The composition of the export basket, ie what a country exports or the export mix. The larger the share of
carbon intensive products (such as cement or aluminium) the higher the carbon intensity of exports. This is
the subject of this policy brief.
2) The way electricity is produced, ie the electricity mix. Electricity is one of the main inputs of many indus-
tries responsible for a large share of total carbon emissions. The way electricity is produced is therefore an
important factor in determining the direct and indirect carbon intensity of any product. Electricity genera-
tion from fossil fuels such as coal or gas is more carbon intensive than hydro- or nuclear power
2.
3) Finally, the way products are produced, ie the technology mix: there are different ways to produce a product
by using different production processes and combinations of inputs (energy amongst them). Some ways
are more carbon intensive than others
3.
The export mix only partially explains the differences in the carbon intensity of exports across countries (see
Figure 1). The technology and electricity mixes are responsible for the rest. Both these factors and the interac-
tion of all three elements explain the difference between the total carbon intensity of exports and the carbon
intensity associated with the export mix (which is illustrated in Figure 1).
For some countries, the technology mix plays an important role in explaining carbon intensity. This is for exam-
ple the case for non-metallic mineral products in Spain and Portugal, transport in Denmark, the Netherlands and
Portugal, and paper products in Finland. Such sectors emit substantially above the European average. Canada’s
industry is in general more carbon intensive than EU industry.
The energy mix determines the higher carbon intensity of exports from Greece, the US and Finland. France,
Austria and Belgium rely on nuclear power (France and Belgium) or hydro-power (Austria) and have a less
carbon intensive electricity mix than the EU average (thus in general their energy intensive sectors emit
relatively less carbon).
Figure 1:
total carbon intensity of exports and carbon intensity of the export mixb
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WHY EUROPE IS NOT CARBON COMPETITIVE
4See Ahmad and
Wyckoff (2003) for a
detailed analysis of
carbon content of trade.
For a more detailed sec-
toral analysis see eg
Demailly et al (2007).
5Data are only available
for 11 countries. See
Box 2.
6The sample includes
Austria, Australia,
Belgium, Brazil, Canada,
Switzerland, China, the
Czech Republic,
Germany, Denmark,
Spain, Finland, France,
Greece, Hungary,
Indonesia, Ireland,
India, Italy, Japan,
Korea, the Netherlands,
Norway, New Zealand,
Poland, Portugal, Russia,
Sweden, Slovakia,
Turkey, Taiwan, the UK
and the US.
7These are the most
recent environmental
data for European coun-
tries. 2002 data are
only available for
Denmark, Germany,
Netherlands and United
Kingdom.
8http://www.eiolca.net
have a relatively low level of carbon
intensive exports while Greece,
Finland and Portugal have a high
level of carbon-intensive exports.
Surprisingly, the level of emissions
embodied in US exports is similar to
that of some EU countries such as
Spain. Despite the carbon intensity
of the US economy overall (in terms
of carbon emissions per unit of
GDP), US exports are closer in terms
of carbon content to EU’s exports
4. 
The total carbon intensity of exports
(See Box 2) is determined by the
composition of the export basket (ie
the export mix), the combination of
inputs and the technology used in
the production process (the
technology mix); and the way
electricity is produced (the
electricity mix). Here we isolate the
impact of the export mix by deter-
mining its carbon intensity.
The role of the export mix in deter-
mining the carbon content of
exports can be isolated by evaluat-
ing the carbon content of producing
each country’s export profile using
the same technology and electricity
mix. We use EU total (direct and indi-
rect) emissions per sector to evalu-
ate the carbon content of different
countries’ exports
5. In this way, we
remove the impact of different tech-
nologies and a different energy mix
and concentrate on the carbon
intensity of the export mix (see Box
3 for details).
3.WHY EUROPE’S EXPORT
MIX MATTERS
Europe’s exports are very diversified
(see Baumann and Mauro, 2007):
Europe exports capital, research and
labour-intensive goods. This con-
trasts with the US and Japan, which
are more specialised in research-
intensive exports. China and other
emerging economies specialise in
labour-intensive products. In addi-
tion, China’s exports are becoming
increasingly research intensive.
Russia has an export specialisation
in capital and raw materials inten-
sive goods.
This can be easily translated in
terms of carbon intensities (see
Table 1). Capital intensive goods
such as mineral products and ener-
gy are generally highly carbon
intensive. Services and research-
intensive goods such as machinery
and equipment are low-carbon
intensive. Labour intensive goods
BOX 3
METHODOLOGY AND DATA
The total carbon intensity of exports is measured as the amount of
carbon dioxide emitted per unit of exports. To calculate it, we base our-
selves on input-output (I-O) analysis which allows us to determine
how each sector contributes to the production of other sectors.
Expanding I-O tables to include sectoral carbon emissions allows us to
calculate the total direct and indirect carbon emissions for each sector.
An Environmentally Extended Input Output (EEIO) table is an Input-
Output table extended to include environmental data (see European
Commission (2006) for an exhaustive account of the EEIO). 
We use the most recently available I-O harmonised tables, provided by
the OECD, and released in February 2007. These tables refer to the
period 1998-2001, and cover 33 countries
6. Original OECD tables are
available on a 41 industry-by-industry basis and are then aggregated
in 26 industries in order to fit Eurostat environmental tables. Finally, all
monetary data are expressed in the same currency unit, euro 2001.
We use Eurostat 2001 data on carbon dioxide air emissions, broken
down into 26 industries
7. This covers twelve EU15 countries (Austria,
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the UK). Data for 2002 for Canada are
provided by Canada Statistics. For the US we use 2002 data provided
by the EIOLCA model of the Carnegie Mellon Green Design Institute
8.
The I-O table describes a situation of market balance. Indeed, when
supply equals demand, output has to be equal to the sum of intermedi-
ate consumption and final consumption. In other words, output (x)
should equate to the sum of intermediate demand by other industries
(Ax) – where Ais the matrix of inter-industry transactions – plus final
consumption (y):
x = Ax + y
Or, rearranging:
x = (I – A)
–1y
The total direct and indirect CO2 emissions are computed by adding
the tonnes of carbon dioxide emitted by each sector per monetary unit
(Million € 2001) of output (b):
bx = b(I-A)
–1yWHY EUROPE IS NOT CARBON COMPETITIVE
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are low (textiles) to medium (pulp
and paper) carbon intensive.
Finally, raw materials (agriculture,
food, and refinery) have a diverse
carbon profile, from low to high. 
Putting together the export mix and
the sectoral carbon intensity we
observe that the EU’s exports
contain on average more carbon-
intensive products than US and East
Asian exports. This is due to
Europe’s higher specialisation in
capital intensive goods and lower
specialisation in services and
research intensive goods (see
Figure 2). Highly carbon intensive
products, such as metallic and non-
metallic mineral products or refinery
products, play a smaller role in US
exports than in EU exports, while
low-carbon products such as servic-
es and technology products consti-
tute a larger share of US exports
than of EU exports. China and Japan
(and other East Asian economies)
also have a larger share of
technology products with low
carbon intensity in their export mix
than the EU. In addition, China also
exports low-carbon labour intensive
products such as textiles. 
Interestingly, the carbon profiles of
China and India’s exports differ sub-
stantially. As pointed out by Rodrik
(2006), the degree of sophistica-
tion of China’s exports is higher than
that of India’s exports, which deter-
mines the lower carbon content of
China’s exports. Despite the increas-
ing weight of services exports from
India (eg software), agricultural
products still play a prominent role.
Russia’s exports are mainly com-
posed of coke and refined petrole-
um products and metal manufactur-
ing products which are heavily
carbon intensive.
Table 1
Direct and indirect carbon intensity
Carbon intensity Industry
HIGH Energy; metallic and non-metallic mineral products;
refinery
MEDIUM Chemicals; agriculture and fishing; transport and
communications; pulp and paper
LOW Services; food; machinery and equipment; textiles; rubber
and plastics
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Figure 2: composition of the export mix (%)
Source for both figures: Bruegel  based on OECD and Eurostat. See Box 3.
Figure 3: carbon intensity of the export mix (% with reference to EU avg.)WHY EUROPE IS NOT CARBON COMPETITIVE
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In aggregate, how carbon intensive
are the export mixes of different
countries relative to that of the EU?
The carbon intensity of the US export
mix proves to be particularly low:
more than 15 percent lower than
that of the EU (see Figure 3), The
export mix of East Asian countries is
between six (for China) and 20 per-
cent (for Taiwan) less carbon inten-
sive than the EU. Emerging
economies such as Brazil and India
have a more carbon intensive export
mix than the EU average due to their
specialisation in raw materials.
The picture is, however, not homoge-
neous within Europe: Ireland,
Sweden, Hungary and the United
Kingdom specialise in technology
goods, resulting in low-carbon inten-
sive export mixes. Services also
constitute an important part of the
UK’s exports, contributing to a lower
carbon intensity.
Germany, Finland, Italy and France
specialise in technology industries
but also have considerable exports
of more carbon intensive products
(eg paper products in Finland, metal
products in Germany and metal
products and chemicals in France).
Portugal, Italy and Greece are highly
specialised in textile products,
which have a low carbon content.
The remaining European countries
have a rather diversified export mix
with a relatively larger share of
medium- and high-carbon intensive
products such as chemicals, metals
and transport and communications.
New member states, with the
exception of Hungary, also have a
relatively large share of high-carbon
intensive products in their exports.
To sum up, the EU is on average
more specialised in exporting
carbon intensive products than
trade competitors such as US, Japan
and East Asian countries. Thus the
EU’s export mix (all other things
being equal) is more sensitive to
carbon pricing schemes than most
of its competitors.
4.THE COVERAGE OF
CARBON PRICING
SCHEMES ALSO MATTERS
Fighting climate change requires
cutting carbon emissions. Putting a
price on carbon is a way of creating
incentives to reduce emissions.
There are several schemes in place
to price carbon, including carbon tax
schemes or the setting of carbon
emission quotas together with cap-
and-trade schemes (see Box 1).
Such pricing schemes are not usual-
ly comprehensive and only cover a
number of sectors. For example, the
EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS)
only covers large installations in
specific sectors, representing
around half of Europe’s carbon
emissions.  These installations
include combustion plants, oil
refineries, coke ovens, iron and steel
plants, factories making cement,
glass, lime, brick, ceramics, pulp
and paper. These amount to a large
share of carbon emitting sectors but
other important sectors in terms of
emissions, such as agriculture and
transport, are excluded.
When determining the impact of
carbon pricing, the coverage of any
carbon pricing scheme, as well as
carbon content, is important. Two
countries with the same carbon
emissions profile can be very differ-
ently affected depending on which
sectors cause such emissions. Any
international carbon pricing scheme
with partial coverage would favour
those countries which are spe-
cialised in excluded sectors. For
example, the scope of the current EU
ETS would only cover between 45
and 55 percent of the carbon diox-
ide embodied in Irish, Danish and US
exports, while covering nearly 65
percent in the cases of Sweden,
Finland and Austria
9(see Table 2).
In the (unlikely) hypothetical case
that there were a universal carbon
pricing scheme with the same cov-
erage as the EU ETS, countries
would be affected differently.
Countries with a relatively clean
export mix such as Germany and
Carbon intensity of export mix
Low High
Share of
emissions
covered by
current ETS
High
TW JP ID
KR HU SE
CN DE CA
IT PL PT
FI AT CZ
SK BE RU
Low
US UK NO
AU IE
ER BR CH IN
NL DK NZ
GR TK FR
Table 2: export mix and sectoral coverage of carbon pricing schemes
High impact
Medium impact
Low impact
Source: Bruegel. Classification with respect to EU average.
9Figures are
approximate since the
sectors covered by the
ETS do not exactly
coincide with the
sectors in our sample.
Also, the ETS does not
cover all emissions
within a sector but only
those from installations
above a certain size.WHY EUROPE IS NOT CARBON COMPETITIVE
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Commission has
proposed including
aviation in the ETS from
2011.
Japan (and other East Asian coun-
tries) would be penalised by a
scheme with the scope of the cur-
rent ETS that would cover a large
share of their emissions. On the con-
trary, countries highly specialised
in medium carbon intensive sectors
such as agriculture (eg emerging
economies such as India, and
Brazil) and transport (eg Denmark
and Greece) which are currently
excluded from the scope of the ETS
would benefit in relative terms from
a scheme with the same coverage
as the ETS.
In the case of the US, where the
export mix contains fewer carbon
intensive products than the EU, a
scheme that replicated the coverage
of the ETS would encompass a lower
share of exports than in the EU. The
US export mix would be in a better
position than the EU export mix vis-
à-vis an ETS-like scheme, given the
US’s greater level of specialisation in
technology products, services and
transport, which would be largely
excluded from the scope of the
scheme.
If transport were included among
the sectors subject to carbon pricing
(either through a cap-and-trade
system or taxation)
10, the resulting
scheme would be closer to full
pricing of carbon emissions from all
sources. Indeed, a scheme including
the current ETS sectors plus trans-
port would, for most countries, cover
more than 75 percent of emissions.
Cross-country differences in impact
would thus be narrowed. Expanding
the scope of carbon pricing
schemes not only increases the effi-
ciency of such schemes in reducing
carbon emissions but also reduces
the cross-sector distortions created
by partial coverage.
The distortions created by partial
coverage can be exacerbated by dis-
cretionary measures adopted for
some sectors by governments. For
example, the current EU ETS allows
grandfathering of emission permits
by governments in a somewhat dis-
cretionary fashion and only
requires five percent of the permits
to be allocated via auctions. This
implies that governments can
reduce the burden on some sectors
by grandfathering a larger number
of permits, resulting in identical
industries supporting different bur-
dens depending on their location.
National grandfathering of emission
permits undermines the efficiency
of carbon pricing
policies and intro-
duces competitive
distortions within
sectors since indus-
tries are ‘taxed’ differ-
ently depending on
their location.  
5.POLICY
RECOMMENDATIONS
Europe’s export mix contains a larg-
er proportion of carbon intensive
products than US and East Asian
countries. The US’s specialisation in
exports of services and research
intensive goods makes US exports
less vulnerable to a carbon price
than the EU’s exports. In particular,
the US export mix is nearly 20 per-
cent less carbon intensive than the
EU average. Equally East Asian
countries mainly export technology
and labour intensive goods, result-
ing in an export mix that is between
five and 20 percent less carbon
intensive than the EU’s. This means
that Europe should not only be con-
cerned about the impact on its
competitiveness of a unilateral
carbon pricing scheme, but may
also remain at a disadvantage if
such a scheme is extended across
countries. Of course the story is dif-
ferent for different EU countries.
While the UK and Hungary export
mainly low-carbon products, other
countries such as Belgium and the
Netherlands have a more highly
carbon intensive export mix.
In addition, the coverage of any
carbon pricing scheme determines
the share of emissions subject to a
carbon price. If schemes are partial
they will be inefficient in cutting
greenhouse gases and will also allo-
cate the burden unevenly, and
those with higher
emissions will not
necessarily bear the
greatest burden. In
particular, a carbon
pricing scheme with
similar coverage to
the current ETS
would cover on average a larger
share of emissions in EU exports
than in US exports.
Fighting climate change requires a
firm commitment to cut green-
house gas emissions. However,
the impact on competitiveness
may create incentives for govern-
ments to relax their climate
change policies and to ‘free ride’ on
their implementation. This puts cli-
mate change policies and their
economic impact at the centre of
trade negotiations: negotiating
Kyoto II becomes an important
part of trade policy.
The way to reduce the competitive
impact of climate change policies
without undermining their effective-
ness is not to reduce their scope or to
adopt protectionist measures, but to
develop efficient carbon markets
‘Europe might remain
at a disadvantage
under a global carbon
pricing scheme.’WHY EUROPE IS NOT CARBON COMPETITIVE
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with wide sectoral coverage that
allow a reduction of the cost of cut-
ting emissions.
Policy developments in this area
should take account of:
• The need for efficient carbon
abatement mechanisms that
allow emissions to be cut at the
lowest cost. The impact on
competitiveness of pricing
carbon can be reduced if
emissions are cut where is least
costly to cut them. This requires
not only a well functioning
carbon market but also removal
of obstacles that hold up invest-
ment in cutting emissions in
developing countries (where it
is least costly), and active pro-
motion of the development of
technologies that reduce the
cost of cutting carbon
emissions. Setting additional
targets, such as the biofuels
and renewables targets recently
adopted by the EU, might under-
mine the objective of cutting
emissions at the lowest cost,
while having an impact on
competitiveness. 
• Maximum coverage of carbon
pricing schemes.Increasing the
coverage of carbon pricing
schemes (by increasing the
scope of cap-and-trade
schemes or through a carbon
tax) not only increases the
effectiveness of carbon pricing
schemes (by covering a larger
share of emissions) but also
gives more flexibility in cutting
emissions across sectors at the
lowest cost, and reduces the
competitive distortions across
countries and sectors. The more
sectors included within the
scope of carbon pricing
schemes, the greater the possi-
bilities for cutting emissions at
the lowest cost.
• Consistent coverage across
countries and efficient alloca-
tion of emission permits.Even if
the scope of carbon pricing
schemes were identical across
countries, governments might
still be tempted to reduce the
burden of such schemes on
selected sectors by grandfa-
thering emission permits.
Excluding sectors from the
scope of carbon pricing
schemes or granting free
carbon emission permits can
reduce the impact of carbon
pricing, but also diminishes the
effectiveness of carbon mitiga-
tion policies, creates distortions
across countries and across
sectors and reduces the credi-
bility of climate change policies.
This heats up the debate about
the need for a carbon border tax
in order to compensate for the
different treatment of the same
sector in different countries.
If the allocation of free permits
is decided at national level, the
outcome is likely to distort
production and investment
decisions: carbon-intensive
industries might adopt such
decisions based on the amount
of emission permits they are
allocated free at each location.
Different coverage of carbon
pricing schemes across coun-
tries and, in particular, the
granting of free emission per-
mits at national level introduces
trade distortions that may lead
to protectionist retaliation.
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